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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Addressing  societal  problems  requires  the reorientation  of ﬁrms-in-industries,  including  changes  in  tech-
nology,  belief  systems,  and mission.  The paper  aims  to make  two  contributions  to  the  Dialectic  Issue
LifeCycle  (DILC)  model,  which  captures  the  dynamics  of  socio-political  mobilization  around  societal
problems  and  industry  responses.  First,  the  ﬁve  phases  in  the DILC-model  are  elaborated  with  insights
from  social  movement  theory,  political  science,  public  attention,  issue  management,  corporate  politi-
cal  strategy,  and innovation  management.  Second,  a ‘cyclical’  lifecycle  pattern  is  explored,  in  which  a
social problem  does  not  linearly  progress  through  successive  phases,  but  can  also  move  ‘backwards’
if  public  attention  or political  will  decrease.  We  explore  these  contributions  with  a longitudinal  study
of  the car-safety  problem  and  responses  from  American  automakers  (1900–1995).  We  use  a  combineduto-safety problem quantitative–qualitative  method  that  employs  coupled  time-series  analyses  as  support  for  an  in-depth
case  study.  The  case  study  showed  that  the industry  long  denied  the  inﬂuence  of car  design  on  fatalities,
and  reluctantly  changed  its position  in  the  mid-1960s  (under  pressure  from  public  opinion  and  policy-
makers).  In the  late-1980s,  when  markets  emerged  because  safety  became  part of consumer  preferences,
the  industry  implemented  comprehensive  changes  in  technology,  beliefs  and  mission.
ublis© 2014  The  Authors.  P
. Introduction
This paper deals with societal problems and the reorientation
f ﬁrms-in-industries to address these problems through changes
n technology, belief systems, and industry mission. This topic has
een under-studied in innovation studies, as Morlacchi and Martin
2009: p. 575) note in an evaluation of progress in the ﬁeld: “We
till don’t have a very satisfactory theory of social change. Our abil-
ty to improve social problems remains rather limited, and we do
ot know why we appear to have only modest gains in relation to
any societal problems”. This relative knowledge gap is becom-ng increasingly pertinent with the rise of the new agenda of grand
ocietal challenges such as climate change, energy security, food
afety, and obesity.
∗ Corresponding author at: University of Manchester, Manchester Institute of
nnovation Research, Harold Hankins Building Room 6.01, Oxford Road, Manchester
13  9PL, UK. Tel.: +44 1612757374.
E-mail addresses: frank.geels@mbs.ac.uk (F.W. Geels), c.penna@sussex.ac.uk
C.C.R. Penna).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.09.006
048-7333/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uhed  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
While Foray et al. (2012) made an important step by addressing
the topic of societal problems from the perspective of innovation
systems and mission-oriented R&D, we aim to further develop the
Dialectic Issue LifeCycle (DILC) model (Penna and Geels, 2012),
which focuses on the strategic decisions of ﬁrms-in-industries to
develop and deploy technical solutions to societal problems, and
highlights the dynamics of societal problems in terms of social,
political, and cultural mobilization. So, the DILC-model warns
against the reiﬁcation of societal problems and the assumption
that we  all agree about the deﬁnition and importance of societal
problems. It also warns against the idea that addressing them is
merely an engineering or managerial challenge of developing and
implementing solutions. Instead, the DILC-model emphasizes the
co-evolution between the dynamics of societal problems and the
emergence and application of (technical) solutions, and the strug-
gles, disagreements, and conﬂicts involved in this co-evolution
process.Penna and Geels (2012) developed the DILC-model as an out-
line framework in the context of greening of industry debates,
providing a brief description of the model’s ﬁve phases and an
illustrative case study of interactions between the air pollution
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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roblem and strategic responses from the American car industry
1943–1985). The model’s core logic is that social, cultural and
olitical mobilization processes around a problem gradually lead
o increasing pressures on an industry and that ﬁrms-in-industries
eluctantly reorient towards more substantive technical solutions.
irms initially resist substantial reorientation, because they are
locked in’ by industry regimes which contain four core elements
Geels, 2014): (a) technical capabilities and routines (i.e. techno-
ogical regimes), (b) industry beliefs and mindsets, (c) mission
nd identity, and (d) formal policies and regulations. Because of
arious lock-in mechanisms, ﬁrms-in-industries initially tend to
ownplay the importance of societal problems or resist substantial
echnical changes. The ‘un-locking’ of ﬁrms and the move towards
eorientation therefore tends to require increases in socio-political
ressures, resulting from mobilization processes.
To capture the temporal dynamics (‘lifecycle’) of societal prob-
ems and industry responses, the DILC-model distinguishes ﬁve
hases. Societal problems (or ‘issues’) ﬁrst emerge in civil society
with activists, disadvantaged groups or researchers articulating
riticisms), then spill over to wider publics, and then enter pol-
cy debates. While mobilization in the ﬁrst three phases mainly
ccurs in the socio-political environment, the societal problem
ffects the industry’s economic environment in the fourth and
fth phase, ﬁrst via substantive legislation that affects economic
rame conditions, followed by changes in consumer preferences
nd market demand1. With regard to industry responses, the DILC-
odel suggests that ﬁrms initially ignore or deny the societal
roblem, then use various tactics to defend the existing industry
egime, and adopt hedging strategies in the third phase. In the ﬁrst
hree phases, ﬁrms are mainly defensive. Only when increasing
ressures begin to affect the economic environment do industry
ctors move towards diversiﬁcation and reorientation in phases
 and 5. Reorientation implies substantial change in the indus-
ry regime, i.e. not only in technical capabilities, but also in belief
ystems, identities, and industry mission2.
Penna and Geels (2012) qualiﬁed their issue lifecycle model
s dialectic to highlight the struggles between the build-up of
roblem-related pressures and responses from incumbent indus-
ry actors3. Addressing societal problems should therefore not be
een as a consensual managerial challenge, but rather as a deeply
ontested process with multi-dimensional struggles between many
takeholders (ﬁrms, policymakers, consumers, wider publics, social
ovements, activists). Firms-in-industries can be part of the solu-
ion to societal problems. But they are also likely to protect their
ssets, vested interests, and positions for long periods of time,
hich is why industry reorientation tends to involve increasing
roblem-related pressures.The case study of air pollution and the American car industry
ad a relatively good ﬁt with the DILC-model, particularly in the
arlier periods. But Penna and Geels (2012) also identiﬁed some
1 The DILC-model draws on concepts from the triple embeddedness framework
TEF) of industries (Geels, 2014), which conceptualises ﬁrms-in-industries as oper-
ting simultaneously in two external environments (socio-political and economic)
nd in the context of an industry regime (which enables and constrains indus-
ry actors). Operating in multi-dimensional environments, the TEF suggests that
rms-in-industries can use multiple strategies: innovation strategies, economic
ositioning strategies, political strategies and socio-cultural strategies (e.g. framing
trategies, public relations, information campaigns).
2 The latter changes may be more difﬁcult, because they concern changes in ‘ways
f  being’, while changes in technological and regulatory regime elements relate to
ways of doing things’ (Turnheim and Geels, 2013).
3 While Penna and Geels (2012) play on the dialectic notion of thesis (i.e. problem-
elated pressures), anti-thesis (industry resistance), and synthesis, they do not
uggest a strict analogy. Rather than reaching synthesis, they suggest that esca-
ating interactions between thesis and anti-thesis drive the lifecycle to a next phase
n  the DILC-model.Fig. 1. Temporal dynamics of issue lifecycles (Rivoli and Waddock, 2011: p. 91).
deviations, particularly in the two later periods: (a) industry ﬁght-
back delayed and watered down implementation of the 1970 Clean
Air Act, (b) consumer demand for low-emission cars did not materi-
alize, (c) automakers did not accommodate addressing air pollution
problems in their core beliefs or mission.
This paper aims to elaborate the DILC-model in two  ways. The
initial brief description of the ﬁve phases in the DILC-model stayed
close to issue lifecycle theory, which Mahon and Waddock (1992:
p. 22) criticized for “failing to provide an understanding of what
happens within each stage”. The ﬁrst contribution is therefore
to further elaborate core dynamics in each phase by mobilizing
insights from other literatures such as social movement theory,
political science, public attention, issue management, corporate
political strategy, and innovation management.
As a second contribution, we  propose that issue lifecycles may
follow more complex patterns, which do not move linearly and tele-
ologically from problem emergence (phase 1) to resolution (phase
5). More complex patterns can arise if public and political concerns
are not assumed to increase linearly, but can go up and down and
up again. So, while the ‘normal’ issue lifecycle pattern is that actors
address a societal problem by introducing a substantive solution
in the last phase, we aim to further explore the implications of
two other possible outcomes in Fig. 1: (a) the proposed solution
fails, leading to intensiﬁed concern and renewed activism, media
interest, and legislative interest, (b) return to apathy: the proposed
solution does not work, but the public loses interest in the problem.
More speciﬁcally, the paper aims to explore a ‘cyclical’ issue life-
cycle pattern, in which a problem moves backwards and forwards
between phases as problem-related pressures go up and down and
up again.
We illustrate these elaborations with a new historical case
study: car-safety and the American car industry (1900–1995). This
case differs in several respects from the previous air pollution
case. First, while air-pollution innovation focused on one com-
ponent (catalytic converters), safety problems required redesign
of multiple components (e.g. windows, body, instrument panels,
steering column, seatbelts, airbags, brakes). Addressing safety also
required automakers to acquire new capabilities in crash-testing,
crash-worthiness engineering, gas transfer (for airbag inﬂation),
and electronics (e.g. collision sensors in airbags). These new bod-
ies of knowledge were not radical, however, in terms of disrupting
existing competencies, but additional. Second, while public atten-
tion for air pollution followed a single ‘up-and-down’ curve (which
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ups-and-downs’ (see Section 4). Third, contrary to air pollution,
afety concerns did (eventually) spill over to consumer demand,
hich created economic opportunities for safety-innovations. This
ifference relates, at least partly, to the fact that local air pollution
as a collective good problem, whereas car-safety improvements
ffer private beneﬁts. Fourth, contrary to air pollution, American
utomakers did (eventually) incorporate safety in their mission and
ore beliefs, which entailed a cognitive shift from the view that
safety does not sell’ to ‘safety as strategic battleground’. Indus-
ry reorientation was therefore more comprehensive in the case of
uto-safety.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the
onceptual contributions to the DILC-model. Section 3 discusses
ase-selection, methodology and data sources. Section 4 presents
esults of the quantitative analysis. Section 5 presents the in-depth
ualitative case study. Section 6 provides a pattern-matching anal-
sis and discussion. Section 7 draws conclusions.
. Conceptual elaborations of the DILC-model
With regard to the existing issue lifecycle literature, which
ocuses primarily on civil society and policy, the initial DILC-model
Penna and Geels, 2012) made two contributions. First, it sug-
ested that ﬁrms and industries can be part of the solution to
ocietal problems, but that this tends to involve lengthy strug-
les (hence the ‘dialectic’ preﬁx) between ﬁrms-in-industries and
roups mobilizing around societal problems. Second, it suggested
hat (some) societal problems can be addressed with technical solu-
ions, something that the issue lifecycle literature pays relatively
ittle attention to4. With regard to the innovation studies literature,
he initial DILC-model suggested that problems have dynamics of
heir own and that the emanating pressures inﬂuence the willing-
ess of ﬁrms-in-industries to develop and implement (technical)
olutions. Penna and Geels (2012) developed some initial ideas
bout the co-evolution between problem-related pressures and
trategic industry responses. This paper aims to elaborate and sys-
ematize these ideas by mobilizing and integrating insights from
arious sociological, political science and business literatures. Sec-
ion 2.1 summarises general principles from these literatures with
egard to problem-dynamics in three important domains: civil soci-
ty, politics and business. Section 2.2 then articulates more speciﬁc
echanisms for the different phases in the DILC-model, which
elate, amongst others, to: (a) the role of ‘drama’ in attracting pub-
ic attention and creating credibility pressure on policymakers, (b)
he roles of social movements in generating drama and shaping
olicymaking, (c) the shift of problems from policy sub-systems to
acro-political arenas, (d) the creation of closed industry fronts
nd the emergence of cracks in them, (e) the role of various issue
anagement strategies (e.g. ignoring, symbolic action, substantive
ction) when problems affect primary or secondary involvement
renas of ﬁrms, (f) the scope for industry resistance in policy imple-
entation. The articulation of these mechanisms elaborates the
nitial DILC-model. Section 2.3 develops the paper’s second con-
ribution by discussing a ‘cyclical’ issue lifecycle pattern.
.1. General insights from various literatures.1.1. Civil society
The sociological literature on public arenas suggests that pub-
ic attention is an important driver for social problems, because it
4 This relative neglect of technical solutions may  be due to the kinds of social
roblems this literature often addresses, e.g. ethical issues (drug testing in ani-
als), health issues (smoking, alcohol), labour issues (sweatshops), and market
ssues (antitrust).h Policy 44 (2015) 67–82 69
creates a sense of urgency and credibility pressure on policymakers
(Newig, 2004). But social problems need to be deﬁned, interpreted
and articulated in order to have social effects (Blumer, 1971), which
is why problem deﬁnition and framing struggles are important in
early phases. Furthermore, public attention is a scarce resource for
which multiple problems compete in public arenas such as mass
media, parliament and courts (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). Public
attention to a social problem varies over time and is inﬂuenced
by drama (associated with scandals, shocks, protests, and framing
strategies): “The huge number of competing solicitations places a
high premium on ‘drama’, encouraging operatives to cast social
problems in dramatic and persuasive terms. (. . .)  Operatives and
interest groups constantly look for new images and new ways to
capitalize on current events to inject urgency into their presen-
tations” (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988: p. 61). At any point in time,
there are a range of competing social problems which receive dif-
ferent amounts of attention. Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) propose
the following problem hierarchy: (1) a few social problems achieve
‘celebrity status’, attracting much attention, (2) a larger number of
problems command some public attention; communities of profes-
sionals, activists, and interest groups work to keep these problems
alive; (3) the majority of social problems remains on the margins of
public discourse. Protagonists of social problems aim to move their
problem up this hierarchy by attracting more attention.
The creation of organized social movements is an important
step in the social mobilization around problems (Elzen et al.,
2011). Social movement theory suggests that social movement
organizations (SMOs) engage in three kinds of activities to drive
problems forward (McAdam et al., 1996). First, SMOs  mobilize
resources (money, members, expertise) and draw attention to
problems through public demonstrations, media campaigns, edu-
cational efforts, boycotts, and petitions. These activities aim to
imbue social problems with drama and urgency. Second, SMOs aim
to shape public debates around social issues by advancing certain
frames, discourses and problem deﬁnitions that convey urgency
and drama (Benford and Snow, 2000). Third, SMOs engage in polit-
ical activities to push problems onto political agendas. The success
of these activities is shaped by (changes in) political opportunity
structures, such as shifts in political coalitions, the rise of new
political parties, and elections (McAdam et al., 1996).
2.1.2. Politics
Public policies are important to address societal problems,
because private actors have few immediate reasons to address
them (because of ‘public goods’ considerations). The develop-
ment and implementation of new substantial policies is a deeply
political process, for which political science approaches provide
relevant conceptualizations. Punctuated equilibrium theory (True
et al., 1999), for instance, distinguishes between macro-politics
(associated with Parliament, Congress, and the government) and
policy sub-systems (associated with specialists in the bureau-
cracy, congressional subgroups, interest groups and stakeholders).
Most policymaking happens in policy sub-systems, which oper-
ate outside the public spotlight. The advocacy coalition framework
(ACF) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999) suggests that policy sub-
systems are populated by multiple advocacy coalitions, which are
networks of actors (agency ofﬁcials, legislators, interest groups,
applied researchers, think tanks) that share a set of policy core
beliefs, which include “value priorities and basic perceptions con-
cerning the general seriousness of the problem and its principal
causes” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: p. 122). When one
advocacy coalition dominates the sub-system, it has a monopoly
on policy agendas. Sub-system policymaking is characterized by
incremental change resulting from bargaining among members
of (dominant) advocacy coalitions, marginal moves in response
































































widely shared and who  are without power” (Rivoli and Waddock,
2011: p. 90). Early activists have urgent claims but neither power
nor legitimacy. Mitchell et al. (1997: p. 875) characterize them as0 F.W. Geels, C.C.R. Penna / R
monitoring the effects of policies and making adjustments). Poli-
ymaking in policy sub-system is path dependent (Pierson, 2000),
ecause actors share policy core beliefs and because policymakers
re dependent on industry actors for jobs, taxes, and economic
rowth (Luger, 2000), which makes them receptive to industry
ishes. While advocacy coalitions are usually able to contain policy
gendas, issues sometimes become ‘hot’ and move into the macro-
olitical domain. This heating up can be related to shocks, scandals,
uccessful social movement activities, and rising public attention.
acro-political actors (government, Parliament) deal with high-
roﬁle (‘celebrity’) issues, under close scrutiny from the media and
ider publics. Because macro-political actors are less constrained
y advocacy coalitions, they are able to introduce major policy
hange (True et al., 1999). ACF-scholars further suggest that major
olicy change tends to be accompanied by a change in policy image
r core beliefs, i.e. a reframing of the issue leading to a different
roblem-deﬁnition (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999).
These political science conceptualizations have the following
mplications for issue lifecycles. In early stages, existing policy sub-
ystems may  be relatively unreceptive to new social problems.
ew problems therefore need to be pushed onto policy agendas by
ocial movements and public attention, which is often ampliﬁed by
he mass media (Newig, 2004). When problems enter policy agen-
as, sub-system actors initially tend to advance incremental policy
hanges that stay close to existing interests and policy beliefs. More
ubstantive policy change (in phase 4 and 5 of the DILC-model) often
equires a ‘heating up’ of the problem (through drama, shocks, scan-
als), which pushes it into the macro-political arena, where major
olicy change can be enacted.
.1.3. Business
Scholars from the stakeholder literature (e.g. Mitchell et al.,
997) suggests that the salience of societal problems for ﬁrms-
n-industries increases if these problems gain in: (a) urgency (the
egree to which a problem is unacceptable or critical to a stake-
older), (b) legitimacy (the degree to which problem-related claims
ain acceptance and are seen as appropriate in relation to wider
ocial norms, values, and beliefs), and (c) power (the degree to
hich the problem is supported by wider stakeholders with coer-
ive, utilitarian or normative power). We  suggest that these three
imensions are linked, respectively, to social movement activity,
ublic opinion, and politics, which we discussed above. Issue man-
gement scholars (Mahon and Waddock, 1992) further propose
hat ﬁrms pay attention to societal problems depending on whether
hese affect their “primary involvement arena” (area of activities
elated to core mission and resource ﬂows) or “secondary involve-
ent arena” (areas that affect ﬁrms, but are not central to their
ission). Firms take no action if problems affect neither arena;
hey engage in ‘symbolic action’ (discussed further in Section 2.2) if
roblems affect secondary involvement arenas; and they engage in
substantive action’, which “demands the expenditure of resources
money, equipment, personnel, etc.)” (Mahon and Waddock, 1992:
. 27), if problems affect primary involvement arenas. We  propose
o further differentiate substantive responses into incremental and
adical innovation.
Firms-in-industries can develop technical solutions to soci-
tal problems. The innovation management literature therefore
as relevant insights to offer, especially with regard to incre-
ental and radical innovation. Firms-in-industries will (initially)
refer incremental innovations that stay close to existing capabil-
ties (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Radical innovation is risky,
ostly (especially in capital intensive industries), and may  dis-
upt sunk investments in capabilities, plants, and supply chains.
espite the risks, costs, and lock-in mechanisms, incumbent ﬁrms
an reorient towards more radical innovations, as the ambidextrous
rganization literature suggests (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996).h Policy 44 (2015) 67–82
Reorientation is a highly strategic process, which top-level man-
agers will only undertake in response to externally imposed
regulations (‘compliance’) or if they see possible economic oppor-
tunities (e.g. positions in new markets). Radical reorientation
is a gradual process progressing through stages: (a) defensive
hedging: exploiting existing capabilities and exploring new ones
(March, 1991), (b) diversiﬁcation: milking sunk investments, while
introducing new technologies in (small) markets, (c) reorientation,
which involves changes in core beliefs, mission, and business
models5.
Firms are not just economic entities, but also political actors,
who can use various strategies to shape the policy process and
hinder the progress of issue lifecycles. In the corporate political
strategy literature (Yofﬁe, 1988; Hillman and Hitt, 1999) we can
ﬁnd the following strategies: (1) Information and framing strate-
gies, e.g. setting up research institutes to investigate the problem;
using expertise to contest scientiﬁc reports about the problem;
publishing reports to inﬂuence problem framing; testify as expert
witnesses in policy hearings. (2) Financial incentives strategies,
e.g. making contributions to politicians or political parties; offer-
ing politicians lucrative jobs at the end of their career. (3) Direct
lobbying strategies, e.g. hiring lobbyists; mobilizing CEOs to speak
with politicians. (4) Confrontational strategies, e.g. opposing laws
through litigation; threatening policy makers with plant closures,
layoffs, or relocation; refusing to obey laws.
When ﬁrms-in-industries recognize that shared interests are at
stake, they may  also create ‘closed industry fronts’ and ‘political
coalitions’ (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: p. 15) that act on behalf
of the entire industry. Front organizations or industry associations
“can be expected to serve as defenders of the status quo and are
a generally conservative force during periods of conﬂict” (Fligstein
and McAdam, 2012: p. 14).
2.2. Towards an elaborated phase-model
Building on the literatures discussed above, this section elabo-
rates the DILC-model by positioning speciﬁc insights about causal
mechanisms in the ﬁve different phases. For each phase, the discus-
sion addresses: a) the dynamics of societal problems and pressures
emanating from activities of social groups, b) responses from ﬁrms-
in-industries.
2.2.1. Phase 1: Problem emergence and industry neglect
Problem-related pressures: (1) Social problems need to be arti-
culated, as Blumer (1971: p. 301) highlights: “Social problems are
not the result of an intrinsic malfunctioning of a society but are
the result of a process of deﬁnition in which a given condition is
picked out and identiﬁed as a social problem”. Early problem artic-
ulation tends to occur in civil society, e.g. by disadvantaged citizens,
researchers or activists, who express concerns about a problem
or situation. (2) The wider public, consumers, and policymakers
remain unaware or indifferent to the issue.
Industry responses: Firms pay limited attention to societal prob-
lems, because these do not affect their ‘primary’ or ‘secondary
involvement arenas’ (Mahon and Waddock, 1992). When activists
are small, scattered and relatively powerless, ﬁrms-in-industries
tend to downplay their demands. “Corporations can easily ignore
demands by a small number of ‘fringe’ activists whose views are not5 Tushman and Romanelli (1985) label these last two stages ‘strategic
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the ‘mosquitoes buzzing in the ears’ of managers: irksome, but not
angerous”.
.2.2. Phase 2: Rising public attention and defensive industry
esponses
Problem-related pressures: (1) The emergence of social move-
ent organizations (SMOs) is an important dynamic in the second
hase. SMOs engage in resource mobilization, the articulation of
ppealing frames and discourses, and public protest activities,
hich strengthen the urgency of demands and increase media
ttention. “The emergence of interest groups represents a signif-
cant stage in the lifecycle of an issue and can determine whether it
ill die a quiet death or will be catapulted into public awareness”
Greening and Gray, 1994: p. 476). SMO  activities (demonstrations,
rotests, petitions) also add ‘drama’ to the issue, which increases
ublic attention. (2) Public attention may  also rise because of new
ndings, media reports or shocks that act as ‘trigger events’: “Media
lay a major role in assigning importance to issues and expos-
ng gaps between business practices and society’s expectations”
Greening and Gray, 1994: p. 475). (3) In response to rising public
ttention policymakers may  engage in symbolic action, e.g. express
oncerns, organize conferences or create committees to investigate
he problem.
Industry responses: (1) Firms-in-industries begin to defend
hemselves against criticisms when media and public attention
ffect their ‘secondary involvement arena’. They are likely to engage
n symbolic action, which “involves attempts to ‘frame’ an issue”
Mahon and Waddock, 1992: p. 27). They may  use “de-dramatizing
trategies” (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988: p. 62) such as denying the
xistence of the problem, asserting that other matters are more
rgent, highlighting uncertainties in the causality of the problem,
ismissing the opposing camp as uninformed or irrational, sug-
esting that the situation or condition is natural, acceptable, or
nevitable. (2) Firms may  also form a ‘closed industry front’ and cre-
te associations to protect collective interests of an entire industry
Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). (3) When further denial of prob-
ems damages their credibility, industry actors may  accept the
xistence of a problem and allocate some R&D resources towards
ncremental innovations that stay within the bounds of the existing
egime. Firms may  also use these innovation strategies for politi-
al purposes, arguing that regulations are not needed because they
re already working on solutions. (4) In response to rising pub-
ic concerns, relative outsiders (new entrants, fringe actors, ﬁrms
iversifying from other sectors, entrepreneurs) may  start exploring
adical technical alternatives.
.2.3. Phase 3: Political debates, controversies and defensive
edging
Problem-related pressures: (1) On-going SMO  activities and
edia reports further increase public attention in the third phase in
hich policymakers become more seriously involved: “As activism
ontinues, the media tends to take more notice, raising it in public
wareness and increasing the likelihood that institutional pro-
esses will be set in place” (Rivoli and Waddock, 2011: p. 92).
2) Rising public attention creates credibility pressures on policy-
akers who may  set up investigative committees, hold hearing and
rganize debates. Participants in these discussions include activists,
MOs and actors from policy sub-systems (e.g. agency ofﬁcials,
ureaucrats, researchers, industry representatives). The debates
re not just fact-ﬁnding endeavours, but also arenas for framing
truggles. “The problem now becomes the object of discussion, of
ontroversy, of differing depictions, and of diverse claims. Those
ho seek changes in the area of the problem clash with those
ho endeavour to protect vested interests” (Blumer, 1971: p. 303).
ub-system policymakers tend to address the problem in terms of
xisting policy beliefs, advancing incremental policy proposals thath Policy 44 (2015) 67–82 71
stay close to interests of the existing advocacy coalition. Problems
may  remain contained in policy sub-systems if public attention
remains below a certain threshold (Newig, 2004). (3) Public con-
cerns may  lead to the emergence of small niche markets for radical
alternatives, constituted by demand from ‘moral consumers’.
Industry responses: (1) In this phase, industry actors adopt hed-
ging strategies. Their main strategy remains the defence of the
existing regime, both through incremental technical innovations
and through political strategies such as: (a) downplaying the prob-
lem and the need for public policies, (b) claiming that certain
solutions are too costly or technologically infeasible, (c) exploiting
policymakers’ lack of technical knowledge (‘information asymme-
try’) and purposively withholding relevant information. (2) But,
recognizing the possibility that the problem may  affect ‘primary
involvement arenas’ (Mahon and Waddock, 1992), ﬁrms invest
some money in radical innovation. To prepare for future eventual-
ities, ﬁrms thus begin to explore alternatives (March, 1991), either
through internal R&D activities or through alliances (with special-
ist ﬁrms, new entrants, outsiders). (3) These hedging strategies
may  create tensions between efforts to keep the industry together
(‘closed industry front’) and the desire of ﬁrms to distinguish them-
selves (e.g. boost reputations with new technologies). (4) Outside
engineers, new entrants, fringe ﬁrms or suppliers continue to work
on alternative technologies and may  introduce these into small
market niches. They may  also use their experiences with new tech-
nologies to contest the ‘high cost’ or ‘technical infeasibility’ claims
from incumbent ﬁrms.
2.2.4. Phase 4: Formation and implementation of substantive
policy and industry diversiﬁcation
Problem-related pressures: (1) Public attention increases rapidly
in the fourth phase, leading the issue to acquire ‘celebrity status’
and moving into macro-political arenas. (2) Increasing public atten-
tion makes the problem area attractive to policy entrepreneurs
and politicians in macro-political arenas (e.g. Parliament, govern-
ment). “When, public attention poses such political pressure that
politicians see themselves forced to act, unless they wish to risk a
severe loss of popularity, then political action will be taken” (Newig,
2004: p. 168). (3) High-level policymakers may introduce radical
policies to address the problem, which often requires changes in
policy beliefs, problem-deﬁnitions and issue framing (Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Other actors (SMOs, industry associations,
ﬁrms, professional groups) may  engage in highly visible struggles to
shape the policy plans. “The ofﬁcial plan is almost always a product
of bargaining, in which diverse views and interests are accommo-
dated. Compromise, concessions, tradeoffs, deference to inﬂuence,
response to power, and judgments of what may be workable all
play part in the ﬁnal formulation” (Blumer, 1971: p. 304). (4) When
a radical policy has been introduced, policy action shifts towards
implementation, which is often delegated to agencies and actors in
less visible policy sub-systems. Struggles may  ensue about detailed
technical issues or legal ambiguities, which provide opportunities
to oppose: “Legal formalist imagery is at best an abstract ideal and,
in reality, the regulatory legal environment is often ambiguous,
contested and riddled with loopholes. (. . .)  the overall picture is
one of non-compliance, subversion, and evasion” (Edelman and
Suchman, 1996: p. 487). Policy implementation may  be slow or
result in delays and deadlocks.
Industry responses: (1) Because the new policies affect ‘primary
involvement arenas’ (e.g. requiring ﬁrms to meet new standards),
ﬁrms engage in substantive action (Mahon and Waddock, 1992).
On the one hand, industry actors use political strategies to oppose
policies and hinder implementation. On the other hand, their tech-
nological strategies move towards diversiﬁcation and increasing
R&D investments in new technologies, partly to comply with reg-
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utsiders) and opportunities (increasing market demand). (2) This
ual strategic orientation causes major tensions in the industry.
he closed industry front may  begin to crack when existing ﬁrms
reak ranks or when new entrants (or ﬁrms from other sectors or
ountries) move in to ‘jockey for position’. (3) New capabilities and
egulations begin to transform parts of the industry regime.
.2.5. Phase 5: Spillovers to the task environment and industry
recreation’
Problem-related pressures: (1) In this phase, the problem begins
o affect consumer preferences, which creates markets for radi-
al alternatives and economic opportunities towards which ﬁrms
an reorient. Consumer preferences may  change because public
ebates alter views about appropriate behaviour. (2) Public policies
e.g. adoption subsidies, taxes, regulations) may  also incentivise
onsumers to change practices and adopt new technologies.
Industry responses: (1) The emergence of new markets changes
he economic (task) environment and incentivizes ﬁrms to reori-
nt more wholeheartedly. Firms change economic positioning
trategies towards the new technology, possibly giving rise to inno-
ation races. (2) The problem becomes part of the industry’s core
eliefs and mission, leading to further transformation of the indus-
ry regime (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). These changes are
nlikely, however, unless it also makes economic sense to address
he social problem.
.3. Towards a cyclical issue lifecycle pattern
The ‘linear’ DILC-model described above assumes that public
oncerns and problem-related pressures steadily accumulate in
ne direction (schematically represented in Table 1).
This assumption may  not always be correct, because problem-
elated pressures like public attention can also decrease when
ublics realize the high costs of solutions or “become bored by the
ssue” (Downs, 1972: p. 40). As a second elaboration of the DILC-
odel, we therefore follow the advice from Bigelow et al. (1993)
hat it is worth exploring more complex patterns that deviate from
he ‘normal’ linear-progression lifecycle, discussed above. In partic-
lar, this paper will empirically explore their suggestion that issue
ifecycles may  follow a cyclical path, in which a problem moves
ackwards and forwards between phases until it ﬁnally reaches res-
lution. Following the logic of the DILC-model, we  suggest that this
attern, in particular the notion that issues may  move backwards
o previous phases, is related to: (a) weakening problem-related
ressures (e.g. decreasing public attention, decreasing political
ttention, or decreasing political will to address a problem), (b)
uccessful industry resistance (e.g. political lobbying, socio-cultural
raming strategies), (c) changing macro-contexts (e.g. economic
ecessions or changes in political ideology). So, rather than a linear
rogression through phases (as represented in Fig. 1), we  pro-
ose that problems may  follow a cyclical pathway when struggles
etween issue-proponents and opponents experience more ups
nd downs, depending on variations in strategies, coalitions, and
xternal contexts. As far as we know, the notion of a cyclical issue-
ifecycle pattern and the proposed causal mechanisms have not yet
een empirically explored.
. Methodology
.1. Explanation, process tracing, and pattern-matchingThe DILC-model can be characterized as a ‘modular explanatory
ramework’ (Héretier, 2008), which acknowledges that outcomes
re related to a multiplicity of factors and actors and that a frame-
ork therefore needs to accommodate multiple partial theoriesh Policy 44 (2015) 67–82
or limited causal mechanisms. The elaborated DILC-model in Sec-
tion 2.2 describes a causal chain, divided into ﬁve phases which
contain different causal mechanisms, which were drawn from dif-
ferent theories, discussed in Section 2.1. In terms of Hall’s (2006)
typology, which distinguishes three kinds of explanation (histori-
cally speciﬁc, multivariate, and theory-oriented), the DILC-model
offers theory-oriented explanation that can “elucidate and test
a theory that identiﬁes the main outcomes and attaches special
importance to specifying the mechanisms whereby those determi-
nants bear on the outcome” (Hall, 2006: p. 25). For longitudinal
phenomena, Hall (2006: p. 25) particularly advocates ‘systematic
process tracing’ which he characterizes as follows. “In contrast to
historically speciﬁc explanation, the object is not to provide a com-
plete explanation for why one outcome occurs at a particular time
and place, but to identify the most important elements in the causal
chain generating this class of outcomes. In contrast to multivariate
explanation, this approach attaches less value to securing precise
parameter estimates for a few key variables seen as the ‘ultimate
causes’ of the outcome and more value to identifying regularities
in the causal chain through which the relevant outcome is gener-
ated. The focus is on elucidating the process whereby the relevant
variables have effects”. Other scholars have proposed similar ideas
under headings such as ‘analytical narratives’ (Bates et al., 1998) or
‘process tracing’ (Vennesson, 2008). So, the DILC-model is a mod-
ular explanatory framework that can guide process tracing which
is a form of within-case analysis that identiﬁes steps in a causal
process leading to certain outcomes. Because process tracing in
empirical cases is theory-guided and focused, it deals selectively
with only certain aspects of the phenomenon, meaning that some
information of unique characteristics is lost (Vennesson, 2008).
The procedure to assess the validity of a conceptual framework
is ‘pattern-matching’ which “compares an empirically based pat-
tern with a predicted one” (Yin, 1994: p. 106). Hall (2006) further
adds that: “The observations drawn from the cases are compared
with the predictions from the theory to reach a judgement about the
merits of the theory, on the basis of congruence between the predic-
tions and the observations. This is a matter of judgment, rather than
one of tallying points of congruence” (p. 28). Yin (1994: p. 110), too,
remarks that pattern matching has elements of interpretive anal-
ysis, because it “involves no precise comparisons. (. . .) This lack of
precision can allow for some interpretative discretion on the part of
the investigator.” To provide more guidance, our pattern-matching
in the analysis (Section 6) will focus on comparing the predicted
causal mechanisms in each phase of the DILC-model with the case
descriptions (Section 5). A possible risk in pattern-matching is ‘con-
ﬁrmation bias’ with the researcher only selecting information that
ﬁts the model (‘cherry picking’). To alleviate this risk our pattern-
matching analysis pays special attention to deviations between the
DILC-model and the case. Such deviations may  actually be produc-
tive in terms of stimulating further conceptual reﬂections.
3.2. Case-selection
To test the elaborations of the DILC-model (Section 2.2) and
explore the cyclical issue lifecycle pattern (Section 2.3), we per-
form a longitudinal case study of the American car industry and
the safety-problem (1900–1995). We  have chosen a historical case
because this enables a study of the entire lifecycle of a societal
problem, which is not possible for contemporary problems. Car
accidents and fatalities, which in America peaked at 55,000 deaths
per year in 1970 (Fig. 2), became a ‘celebrity issue’ in the 1960s
when it was seen as a major societal problem by macro-political
actors (including the President), public opinion, media, medical
professionals, and automakers.
We have chosen the American car industry because we expect
struggle and contestation to be particularly present in this
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Uountry, due to confrontational relations between industry and
olicy/society. A complication of this choice is that the car industry
lobalized during the case study period, implying that foreign-
wned car companies also came to operate and sell in the U.S.
arket. However, the Big Three (GM, Chrysler, Ford) dominated
he U.S. market until the mid-1990s, accounting for more than 70%
f sales (Fig. 3). Japanese companies, which entered U.S. markets via
he small-car segment, did not lead in safety-innovations. German
ompanies, particularly Mercedes (owned by Daimler), did pioneer
afety-innovations, but their sales remained limited to the high-end
arket (Mercedes had 0.69% of market share in 1984 and 0.96% in
995). Because of this particular position, the case study will discuss
hem as relative regime outsiders, whose safety-strategies exerted
ressures on the focal ‘domestic’ ﬁrms and contributed to opening
p the industry regime.
The case study not only entailed socio-political mobilization
round the safety-problem, but also resistance and (eventually)
ubstantial industry reorientation and technical change. Ameri-
an automakers long denied the role of car design in fatalities, but
radually changed their position, initially reluctantly under pres-
ure from public opinion and regulation (mid-1960s), but more
ig. 2. Automobile-related fatalities in the United States (based on data from
SDOT/FHWA, 2010).wholeheartedly when safety became part of consumer preferences
(late-1980s). We  bound the case study in 1995, not because the
problem was solved, but because industry actors had by then reori-
ented and included safety in their mission, beliefs and innovation
strategies. The case study also entailed ‘ups and downs’ in pub-
lic attention and a shift in problem-framing, which changed from
an emphasis on road Engineering, law Enforcement, and driver
Education (‘3E-framing’) to an emphasis on car design and injury-
prevention. So, the case is suited to explore more complex issue
lifecycle pathways.
3.3. Methods and data sources
We use a mixed-methods approach, in which a quantitative
analysis supports an in-depth qualitative case study. The quan-
titative method uses four proxies (for public attention, political
attention, policy, and innovative activity) to develop longitudinal
time-series representations as a ﬁrst approach to the case. Through
an exploratory visual examination (Keim, 2002) and bivariate cor-
relation analysis we  aim to ﬁnd overall patterns. We  also use the
time-series representations to divide the longitudinal case study
Fig. 3. U.S. total vehicle sales market, 1946–2012 (Sources: until 1960, White (1971);
after, Ward’s Automotive).





















































Fig. 4. Public attention to auto and highway safety in U.S. newspapers (averaged).
Fig. 5. Political attention to auto and highway safety.4 F.W. Geels, C.C.R. Penna / R
nto shorter periods. We  will introduce the four proxies and discuss
ata sources and limitations.
For public attention, we use newspaper counts as proxy. While
his indicator says little about how issues are discussed, this is the
est quantitative indicator for public attention, because in mod-
rn societies mass media coverage “constitutes by far the most
mportant vehicle for shared attention and political communica-
ion” (Newig, 2004: p. 159). Speciﬁcally, we searched the electronic
atabases of the Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Wall Street
ournal, New York Times, and Washington Post with the keywords
auto safety” and “highway safety” (using the boolean operator
OR”). We  collected all the articles and plotted the average per year.
ethodological caveats that we do not account for are changes in
he length of newspaper or changes in editorial styles.
For political attention, we searched the Congressional
ecord (HeinOnline database) using a set of auto-safety-related
eywords6. The political attention chart plots the yearly number of
elevant publications (outcomes of public hearings, bills proposals,
eports). This indicator does not address content, but does indicate
he evolving attention for topics. We  do not account for temporal
hanges in the political meaning of hearings and bills.
For policy implementation activity, we searched7 the Federal
egister (HeinOnline database) for the number of publications per
ear by executive agencies. This proxy does not account for other
on-published types of policy action.
As a proxy for technical innovation, we searched the U.S. Patent
nd Trademark Ofﬁce database for auto-safety related patents,
rganized along different types (according to patent classes under
hich auto-safety features are classiﬁed). This proxy indicates gen-
ral areas of innovative interest in the industry. A drawback is that
atents are not necessarily translated into products.
Because the proxies are relatively rough and aggregated, they
an only provide general patterns and correlations, but not identify
ausation. To generate more ﬁne-grained analysis and investi-
ate causation, we therefore perform a qualitative longitudinal
ase study of the co-evolution of the auto-safety problem and car
ndustry responses. The case study, which will be guided by the
ILC-model’s conceptual categories, draws on primary and sec-
ndary sources. Primary sources for public protests and discursive
ramings are articles from newspapers and magazines. For indus-
ry views, we draw on industry journals (Ward’s; Automotive News)
nd advertisements. Additionally, we used secondary accounts that
ddress different aspects of auto-safety: legal and political aspects
Weingroff and Seabron, 2003), public criticisms and discursive
truggles (Eastman, 1981, 1984), medical perspective (MacLennan,
988), insurance industry perspective (O’Neill, 2009), seatbelt and
irbag technologies (Miller, 1988; Waters et al., 1998; Struble,
998; Strother et al., 2003; Nilsson et al., 2003; Abeles, 2004); orga-
izational, advertising and corporate safety strategies (Stevenson,
008; Albaum, 2005). By combining these focused studies, we
imed to develop a comprehensive multi-dimensional analysis.
. Quantitative results
Figs. 4–6, respectively, show the public attention to auto-safety,
olitical attention and implementation activity, and safety patents.
Although these graphs should be treated with caution, they
how interesting correlations8 (all signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level):
6 We used the following boolean search string: “auto safety” OR “highway safety”
R  “trafﬁc safety” OR “motor vehicle safety” OR “automobile safety”.
7 We used the same boolean search string as in the Congressional Record search.
8 Because the proxy variables are not normally distributed, our analysis is based
n  the Spearman’s rank correlation coefﬁcients, which is more appropriate for non-
arametric/non-normally distributed data and for small samples. We  employedFig. 6. Automobile safety patents per type of innovation.
• Until 1966, public/media attention (Fig. 4) was strongly cor-
related with the number of fatalities in Fig. 2 (Spearman’s
rho = 0.7153). After 1966, the two series show negative corre-
lation: public attention increases while fatalities decline. This
discrepancy between public attention and ‘objective’ size of the
the so-called ‘Fisher transformation’ of Spearman’s statistic to test whether two
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problem may  be related to increasing cultural sensitivity to
safety, which we will investigate in the case study.
Until 1966, political attention in Congress (Fig. 5) is medially
correlated to public attention (Spearman’s rho = 0.5410). Both
proxies show similar patterns: some (small) peaks in the mid-
1920s and mid-1930s, and a steep rise in 1966 (when the National
Trafﬁc and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA) was  introduced).
After 1966 public and political attention decoupled (Spearman’s
rho = −0.6947). But implementation activity increased steeply
after 1965 and was strongly correlated with public attention
(Spearman’s rho = 0.5728). This points to a shift from the macro-
political agenda to policy sub-systems, where struggles over the
implementation of NTMVSA continued to attract attention.
Technical safety-oriented innovation shows ups and downs
(Fig. 6). A small peak in safety-patenting (1955–1960) signif-
icantly correlates to political attention in Fig. 5 (Spearman’s
rho = 0.7882). A larger up and down pattern (1966–1981) strongly
correlates to implementation action and struggles over NTMVSA
(Spearman’s rho = 0.8674). A third peak (1990–onwards) strongly
correlates both with policy activity and public attention (Spear-
man’s rho = 0.8273 and 0.7563, respectively). We  will investigate
the relative causal inﬂuence of both factors in the case study.
Fig. 6 also shows how attention for speciﬁc technical options
hanged over time. Before the 1950s, safety innovations con-
entrated on accident-avoidance technologies (e.g. brakes, lights,
teering, horns). In the 1970s and 1980s, innovative attention also
ame to focus on seatbelts and airbags, which related to the new
njury-prevention framing. In the 1990s, airbags gained prominence
n safety-innovation strategies (in response to market demand as
he case study will show).
These basic correlations suggest some patterns that resonate
easonably well with the DILC model: (a) public attention precedes
olitical and innovative action (phase 1 and 2), (b) increasing public
ttention is likely to be lead to more political attention (phase 3),
c) substantial laws can (to some extent) force ﬁrms to markedly
ncrease innovative activity (phase 4), (d) major innovative efforts
ccurred in the 1990s (phase 5). But we need the qualitative case
tudy to complement the correlation analysis in order to unravel
ausality.
The time-series (especially for public attention and technology
atenting) also show various ups and downs, which is indicative
f a cyclical issue lifecycle pattern. To further explore this cyclical
attern, and the notion that an issue may  move backwards to previ-
us phases in the DILC-model, the next section makes an in-depth
ualitative analysis.
. Qualitative case study of the U.S. auto-safety problem
1900–1995)
Through a visual-inspection of the time-series (Keim, 2002),
omplemented with qualitative knowledge, we divide the longi-
udinal case into shorter periods: 1900–1924 (emerging public
ttention), 1924–1942 (rising public attention), 1942–1946
disruption by Second World War), 1946–1955 (relatively low,
ut gradually rising public and political attention), 1955–1965
decreasing public attention, but rising political attention),
965–1976 (steep increase in public and political attention, and
ubstantial increase in industry innovation), 1976–1984 (decreas-
ng innovation, due to implementation controversies), 1984–1995
emerging market for safety innovations accelerates patenting
ctivity). For each period, the case study will address: (1) problem-
elated pressures (from social movements, public attention,
olicymakers), (2) response strategies from American automakers
nd initiatives from new entrants or foreign companies.h Policy 44 (2015) 67–82 75
5.1. Problem emergence and industry neglect (1900–1924)
5.1.1. Problem-related pressures
Activists: The diffusion of cars was accompanied by rising fatali-
ties (Fig. 2). Safety activists, newspapers and periodicals expressed
concerns about careless driving and speeding (Eastman, 1984).
In 1915, a safety activist (Julian Harvey) coined ‘the triple E’
(3E) slogan, which emphasized driver/pedestrian Education,  law
Enforcement, and road Engineering. By the 1920s, the 3E-framing
was “almost universally held by the public, private safety organiza-
tions and government” (Eastman, 1984: p. 127). The National Safety
Council (NSC) included highway accidents in its remit. And auto-
mobile clubs lobbied policymakers for legislation, because safety
concerns negatively affected the legitimacy of cars.
Policymakers: The 3E-framing guided local authorities in the
introduction of various regulations, e.g. car registration, driving
schools, driver’s licenses, speed limits, and trafﬁc police (Geels,
2005). Road expansion programmes led engineers to focus on the
inﬂuence of road design in accidents.
Consumers: Cars were ‘toys for the rich’, who engaged in racing,
touring, and promenading (Geels, 2005). Consumers were more
interested in fun than safety. In the 1910s, cars also came to be
used for practical purposes (e.g. commuting to work, travelling
salesmen, doctors, farmers, taxis), but interest in safety remained
limited.
5.1.2. Car industry responses
Car-related fatalities were not high on the agenda of the emerg-
ing car industry, which faced many other issue (Geels, 2005), e.g.
industry shake-out, creation of dealer networks and supply chains,
product and process innovations (assembly lines, mass production
methods). Nevertheless, industry actors dedicated some atten-
tion to safety concerns. They created the Safety First Committee
(1916), which supported the 3E-framing, arguing that people – not
cars – caused accidents. Trade journals coined metaphors such as
‘the reckless driver’ or ‘the nut behind the wheel’, and automak-
ers supported educational efforts. Because accidents were seen as
‘abnormal events’, automakers saw no obligation to design cars for
this ‘unlikely circumstance’ (Eastman, 1984).
5.2. Increasing public concerns and creation of industry front
(1924–1942)
5.2.1. Problem-related pressures
Public attention and activists: Public attention increased rapidly
in the mid-1920s, following national conferences in 1924 and 1926,
and in the mid-1930s, following a 1935 article in Reader’s Digest
(Fig. 7), which acted as ‘trigger event’ (Luger, 2000), drawing atten-
tion to rising fatalities, and vividly describing how doorknobs and
sharp edges in dashboards caused serious injuries. Nevertheless,
the article reproduced the 3E-framing, advocating safe driving, not
design changes.
An alternative to the 3E-framing was advanced by some profes-
sionals such as Dr. Straith, a plastic surgeon, who urged industry
ofﬁcials to redesign cars to minimize injuries in case of crashes
(Eastman, 1981), and DeHaven, a pioneer in crash-injury research
and crash-survival engineering (Hasbrook, 1956), who  showed
that windshield structures and instrument panels caused spe-
ciﬁc injuries. This alternative approach to auto-safety remained
marginal and was  ignored by established safety groups (Weingroff
and Seabron, 2003).
Policymakers: In 1924 and 1926, the federal government orga-
nized National Conferences on Street and Highway Safety,  which were
mainly symbolic in that they expressed concerns but left safety
legislation to state and local governments (Eastman, 1984). The
conferences acknowledged accident-avoidance features (brakes,






























dig. 7. Graphic illustrations of the 1935 Reader’s Digest article (Source: Johnson and
atz, 2009).
teering gears, lighting, horns), but otherwise embraced the 3E-
raming and called for education, enforcement and better roads
MacLennan, 1988).
Consumers: Consumers were interested in fast, large, powerful
nd stylish cars. Amidst the Great Depression, mainstream con-
umers also wanted cheaper cars and exerted no effective demand
or safety-related features (Eastman, 1984).
.2.2. Car industry responses
In response to public concerns and policy debates, automak-
rs created the Automobile Safety Foundation (ASF), which “took
he lead in directing the issue of trafﬁc safety, ensuring that the
ndustry’s interests would be protected” (Luger, 2000: p. 58). The
SF collaborated with safety policy specialists and supported the
E-framing, offering grants for the training of policemen and traf-
c engineers, and assisting education campaigns (Eastman, 1984).
he ASF thus “deﬂected attention away from the dangerous char-
cteristics of cars and trucks manufactured by the auto industry”
Farber, 2002: p. 182).
Technical innovation by the ‘Big Three’ (Ford, General Motors,
hrysler) was mostly guided by speed, engine performance, and
tyle. When advertising practices, which emphasized speed and
erformance, received safety-related criticisms (Stevenson, 2008),
utomakers argued that drivers should be educated not to drive too
ast (Eastman, 1984). Although safety was not a major design princi-
le, car manufacturers did implement incremental design changes
uch as safety glass, which did not splinter into razor-edged glass
ieces in case of accidents (Farber, 2002). They also implemented
nnovations that helped avoid accidents (e.g. hydraulic brakes,
irectional turn-signals)..3. Interruption by the Second World War  (1942–1946)
The issue lifecycle was interrupted by World War  II, which
iminished social and political safety interests. Highway fatalitiesh Policy 44 (2015) 67–82
declined markedly (Fig. 2), because war policies restricted car driv-
ing through the rationing of gas and tires and the ‘Victory Speed’
limit of 35 MPH  (Yates, 1983). The car industry‘s contribution to
the war effort consolidated Detroit’s legitimacy and reputation.
5.4. The high point of the safety establishment and 3-E framing
(1946–1955)
5.4.1. Problem-related pressures
Policymakers: In the post-war decade, highway casualties
rapidly increased (Fig. 2), causing high-level political concerns.
The President organized Highway Safety Conferences (1946, 1949,
1951) to address the issue, and invited well-established actors such
as automakers, industry associations, traditional safety organiza-
tions (NSC, ASF), and highway and trafﬁc engineers (Weingroff
and Seabron, 2003). This coalition succeeded in advancing their
3E-framing, leading the conferences to focus on education, enforce-
ment and engineering (Eastman, 1984). The newly created (1954)
President’s Action Committee on Trafﬁc Safety was also dominated
by established actors with the car industry appointing and paying
the executive director (Luger, 2000). This committee institutional-
ized the 3E-framing at the highest political level and “symbolized
the high point of the status and signiﬁcance of the safety estab-
lishment and of the automobile industry inﬂuence on the highway
safety movement” (Eastman, 1984: p. 147).
Social movements: The dominant 3E-framing was criticized,
however, by two professional communities who articulated an
alternative problem framing focused on car designs and injury-
prevention. First, experimental investigations by crash-injury
researchers showed the inﬂuence of car design features (dash-
boards, steering systems, doors, windshield structures) on injuries
and deaths (Hasbrook, 1956). Second, the medical commu-
nity began advocating design modiﬁcations to minimize injuries
(Eastman, 1981), suggesting the removal of all knobs, cranks, drop-
down ash trays, sharp edges, and advocating the introduction of
collapsible steering columns, hinged windshields, and seatbelts
(Eastman, 1984). By the mid-1950s, the American Medical Asso-
ciation regularly issued resolutions, urging automakers to change
car designs (Luger, 2000).
Consumers and public attention: Consumer demand, which had
been deferred during the war, preferred stylish, extravagant, high-
performance cars (Yates, 1983). Safety was not a primary criterion
for most consumers (Stevenson, 2008).
5.4.2. Car industry responses
The industry’s main political strategy was to support the 3E-
framing through the NSC and ASF, which functioned as an “arm of
the industry” (Luger, 2000: p. 58). This framing protected industry
interests, because it kept car design off the agenda. Automakers also
shaped high-level political agendas through the President’s Action
Committee (Eastman, 1984).
Technologically, automakers continued to pay more attention
to price, styling, gadgetry, and horsepower than to safety (Yates,
1983). Nevertheless, as a defensive hedging strategy, the indus-
try set up safety departments (Chrysler in 1952, Ford in 1955, GM
in 1956) to monitor developments in crash-injury research and
crashworthiness engineering (Luger, 2000).
New entrants: Tucker Corporation and Kaiser-Frazer were
two new companies that used safety to attract attention to
their cars, respectively, the Tucker Torpedo with safety-oriented
design features, and the ‘World’s First Safety-First Car’, which
incorporated a crash-pad that extended throughout the instru-
ment panel, recessed instruments, and a pop-out windshield
(Stevenson, 2008). Their marketing activities, which played on the
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ontrast with the Big Three, stimulated (some) public attention to
afety-design.
.5. Political debates and erosion of the 3E-framing (1955–1965)
.5.1. Problem-related pressures
Public attention, social movements and professionals: Increasing
oubts about the 3E-approach weakened its appeal. The industry
ournal Automotive News (1958) identiﬁed a safety slogan fatigue,
brought on by an overdose of jingles, catchy phrases and righteous
arnings asking us not to kill ourselves”. By the early 1960s, crit-
cism of safety education also appeared in general magazines (e.g.
onsumer Reports, Nation)  (Eastman, 1984).
Simultaneously, the design-oriented injury-prevention framing
athered strength as the crash engineering community organized
nnual conferences that institutionalized the ﬁeld (Eastman, 1981).
nsurance companies (e.g. Liberty-Mutual Insurance Company) also
ecame interested in crash-injury engineering and sponsored the
esign of Survival Car I, which included sixty safety-innovations,
.g. safety belts, ‘extra-heavy’ padding, recessed buttons, passen-
er seats facing backwards, levers instead of steering wheels. And
he medical community campaigned for seatbelt installation (por-
raying seatbelts as the ‘medicine’ that was being withheld from
atients), urging Congress to issue car-safety standards, and pub-
ishing journal articles on automobile crash injuries (Eastman,
984).
Policymakers: Political debates, for instance hearings in the Spe-
ial Subcommittee on Trafﬁc Safety (1956, 1959), became more
ritical of the 3E-approach and increasingly advocated the intro-
uction of safety standards by the federal government (Bollier and
laybrook, 1986). Some states (Wisconsin 1961, New York 1962)
egan introducing mandatory seatbelt use laws.
.5.2. Car industry responses
Automakers disliked the increasing attention for car design and
sed political strategies to hinder safety standards. The Automo-
ile Manufacturers Association (AMA), for instance, lobbied against
egulations in subcommittee hearings, highlighting the ‘lack of
emand’ for safety-innovations (Weingroff and Seabron, 2003).
While the industry maintained a political front, early tensions
merged regarding safety-related design innovations. To counter
eclining market shares, Ford decided to develop and advertise cars
ith a ‘safety package’ (1956), which included safe door-latches,
ecessed hubs, steering wheel with energy absorbing capability,
added instrument panels, and optional (lap) seatbelts (Eastman,
984). The consumer response was limited but positive. GM,  how-
ver, “expressed its disapproval of the safety campaign directly to
ord’s top executives”, using “the weight of its enormous monopoly
ower to have it halted” (Luger, 2000: p. 63). Ford subsequently
ropped its safety initiative (Stevenson, 2008), so GM succeeded
n restoring a closed industry-front. Ford’s initiative was  labelled a
arket failure, hardening the belief that ‘safety does not sell’. Tech-
ological strategies subsequently focused on accident-avoidance
nnovations (e.g. improved headlights, emergency ﬂashing sys-
ems) instead of injury-prevention (Eastman, 1984).
New entrants and regime outsiders: Independent crash engineers
eveloped radical ideas and solutions such as the airbag (1953)
nd three-point seatbelt system (1955). The airbag patent attracted
ome attention from Ford and GM,  which both explored it in the
ate 1950s (Sherman, 1995). After a few years, they discontinued
irbag activities because of two engineering challenges: (a) quickly,
eliably, and accurately sensing a collision, (b) inﬂating the airbag in
orty milliseconds (Sherman, 1995). The 21 airbag patents between
953 and 1966 (Fig. 6) were all assigned to independent inventors
r auto-industry outsiders.Fig. 8. GM’s harassment of Ralph Nader (Johnson and Katz, 2009; cartoon from
Washington Post, March 24, 1966).
5.6. Public escalation, radical legislation and policy
implementation struggles (1965–1976)
5.6.1. Problem-related pressures
Public attention: Public attention exploded (Fig. 4), because
of the 1965–1966 Ribicoff hearings (see below) and a scandal
around Ralph Nader, who  wrote the book Unsafe At Any Speed
(1965) which synthesized crash-injury research and described
the industry’s political opposition to safety standards. When
Nader was called to testify in the Ribicoff hearings, GM hired
a private investigator to look into his personal affairs, with
the goal of blackmailing or discrediting him (Luger, 2000).
When these investigations became public (Fig. 8), public outrage
made Nader into a national ﬁgure and forced GM to apolo-
gize, which “sent shock waves throughout the industry and
further diminished the credibility of the automakers among the
public” (Luger, 2000: p. 70).
The scandal also catapulted auto-safety into the macro-political
arena, where high public scrutiny exerted pressures on politicians
to act. In the late 1960s, public attention declined somewhat (Fig. 4),
as the safety issue moved into the administrative arena for imple-
mentation and became more technical.
Policymakers: In 1965–1966, Congress organized the Ribi-
coff hearings to investigate why  trafﬁc fatalities continued to
rise, despite various safety policies. The hearings exposed “the
industry’s disregard for vehicle safety” (Luger, 2000: p. 8),
moving auto-safety into the national political spotlight. Sena-
tor Robert Kennedy, in particular, criticized the industry’s lack
of investment, noting that GM spent less than 0.1% of pro-
ﬁts on safety innovation (Luger, 2000: p. 68). The industry’s
legitimacy was further undermined by the Nader-scandal and
the discovery of 426 secret recall cases of faulty automobiles
between 1960 and 1966. “Legislators now were inclined to see
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he industry as not just uncooperative but as unreasonable”
Luger, 2000: p. 72). These developments represented a “turning
oint in creating a climate in Congress conducive to the passage of
 meaningful automobile safety bill” (Eastman, 1984: p. 246).
In 1966, Congress adopted the National Trafﬁc and Motor Vehi-
le Safety Act (NTMVSA), which articulated safety-performance
tandards and established the National Highway Trafﬁc Safety
gency (NHTSA) to implement them. The standards included
rash-avoidance (lights, brakes, tires), crash-survival (padded
nstruments, head restraints, seatbelts, energy-absorbing steer-
ng columns) and post-crash (fuel systems integrity) speciﬁcations
Bollier and Claybrook, 1986).
In subsequent years, the safety issue moved back to the pol-
cy sub-system, where struggles focused on implementation of the
tandards (Luger, 2000). Standard 208 (seat-belt installation) in
articular became the focus of a long-lasting controversy, when, in
969, NHTSA upgraded it to a passive restraint standard9. While
egulators, safety-advocates, and insurance companies assumed
his implied airbag systems, automakers preferred cheaper auto-
atic seatbelts with an ignition-interlock system (Abeles, 2004). By
974 this seatbelt-airbag controversy became deadlocked (Miller,
988).
Consumers: Despite escalating public and political attention,
onsumer demand for safety-innovations remained limited. The
973 oil shock and subsequent recession stimulated demand for
heaper, smaller, fuel-efﬁcient cars.
.6.2. Car industry responses
The Ribicoff hearings, where automakers argued against fed-
ral regulations, turned into a public relations disaster because
xecutives responded poorly to critical questions (Eastman, 1984).
he Wall Street Journal (July 20, 1965) ascertained that: “so dis-
al  [was] the auto industry’s performance at the Senate’s safety
earings that the chances of Federal legislation in the ﬁeld have
arkedly increased”.
Once the NTMVSA (1966) was passed, automakers reluctantly
omplied and introduced some safety-innovations as standard
quipment, e.g. energy-absorbing armrests, collapsible steering
olumns, energy-absorbing bumpers, roll-over safety structures
Abernathy et al., 1983). But automakers also resisted the
mplementation of certain standards, claiming that these were
echnically unfeasible or required expensive retooling (Bollier and
laybrook, 1986). They attacked the original Standard 208, claiming
hat Americans would not wear seatbelts (Luger, 2000). Automak-
rs then installed cumbersome belts, with shoulder belts separated
rom lap harnesses. “If people wanted an excuse for not taking
he trouble to buckle their seatbelts, the manufacturers gave it
o them” (Waters et al., 1998: p. 1338). The industry litigated
gainst the upgraded Standard 208 on the basis of technical details
egarding airbags. The U.S. Court of Appeals extended the compli-
nce deadline and, meanwhile, allowed automakers to comply with
gnition-interlock systems (Bollier and Claybrook, 1986). These sys-
ems, which sounded an alarm if the driver did not buckle up,
nnoyed drivers, many of whom disconnected the system and
rote complaint letters to policymakers (Abeles, 2004). In 1974,
ongress repealed the requirement of interlock systems, causing
tandard 208 to reach a stalemate.
While automakers publicly resisted airbags, they privately
estarted airbag innovation programs in the late 1960s taking
dvantage of new technologies such as detonating valves for very
apid gas transfer, solid propellant (sodium azide) for airbag inﬂa-
ion, and reliable collision sensors (Sherman, 1995; Strother et al.,
9 ‘Passive’ safety technologies do not require action from the driver/passenger.Fig. 9. Real net income (2011 dollars) of the Big Three (Penna and Geels, 2012).
2003). These R&D activities caused a peak in airbag patenting
activities in the mid-1970s (Fig. 6). In 1974, the industry’s front
against airbags seemed to crack when GM announced plans for a
sales program and tooled up to produce 100,000 airbag-equipped
cars (Struble, 1998). Despite GM subsidies, consumers bought only
10,000 of these cars (Albaum, 2005). In 1976, GM dropped its airbag
strategy. Others followed, causing a decline in airbag patenting
(Fig. 6).
New entrants and regime outsiders: Foreign companies
(Mercedes-Benz, Volvo) began to use safety advertising as an
entry point into the American market, which helped build con-
sumer awareness. After 1976, Mercedes became the only carmaker
working on airbags (Nilsson et al., 2003).
5.7. Moving backwards because of weakening political pressure
(1976–1984)
5.7.1. Problem-related pressures
Public attention: As the safety issue moved to the administrative
arena and implementation debates became more technical, public
attention declined in the mid-1970s (Fig. 4). Attention increased
again in the late 1970s, partially triggered by 500 crashes with the
Ford Pinto subcompact car, in which people had burned to death
because of a ﬂawed fuel-tank design. The scandal was that Ford
allegedly knew of the hazard, but decided not to ﬁx it because cost-
beneﬁt analysis showed the change was  not proﬁtable. The public
was shocked that Ford placed a dollar value on human life. “For the
public, the case came to stand for Detroit’s disregard for vehicle
safety” (Luger, 2000: p. 83).
Policymakers: In the late 1970s, political pressure weakened
because of concerns about the industry’s economic problems.
Shrinking markets and declining market shares (due to increasing
Japanese competition) caused substantial losses (Fig. 9), which led
to a bailout of Chrysler in 1979.
Politicians provided tax reliefs and ﬁnancial aid to the indus-
try and weakened safety regulations. The Reagan administration
(1981–1989) favoured further regulatory rollbacks and proposed
to abandon more than 34 safety, emissions and fuel economy reg-
ulations (Luger, 2000).
The controversy over standards (particularly 208) also contin-
ued, which slowed down industry innovation efforts. Successive
Transportation Secretaries ﬁrst (in 1976) proposed to with-
draw Standard 208 if automakers would produce 40,000–400,000
airbag-equipped cars for demonstration programmes (Bollier and
Claybrook, 1986), then (in 1977) reissued Standard 208, argu-
ing that a demonstration programme was  not necessary, and
then (in 1981) repealed the standard as part of Reagan’s regu-
latory rollback, arguing that costs outweighed beneﬁts (Miller,









































cars should have driver-side and passenger-side airbags. Because
airbags were by then already a reality in the marketplace, theig. 10. Increasing seatbelt use (Committee for the Safety Belt Technology Study,
003: p. 6).
988). Consumer groups and insurance companies challenged this
ecision (Waters et al., 1998), leading to prolonged legal struggles
n the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court (1982–1984).
Consumers: In the luxury market segment consumers began to
how some interest in safety, which beneﬁtted European automak-
rs such as Mercedes.
.7.2. Car industry responses
American automakers continued to hinder safety standards
such as 208), arguing against airbags because of high costs, lack
f consumer demand, risk of liability claims if airbags would not
nﬂate properly, technical installation difﬁculties in small vehicles
Strother et al., 2003; Struble, 1998). Automakers also engaged
n legal struggles, which created regulatory uncertainties that
iminished their dedication to safety innovation strategies (Fig. 6).
ndustry resistance also had an ideological component, as a New
ork Times editorial (1981: p. A30) noted: “The real mystery (. . .)
s why the auto industry ﬁghts safety so hard. The explanation for
he mystery may  be as simple as it is sad: American auto mak-
rs (. . .)  oppose airbags because they would give regulation a good
ame”.
New entrants and regime outsiders: Insurance companies, engi-
eers and airbag suppliers contested the industry’s arguments
gainst airbags, arguing that technical difﬁculties were solved and
hat costs were half of what automakers claimed (Abeles, 2004).
any suppliers had to stop production, however, because airbag
arkets did not materialize (Albaum, 2005). Only Mercedes con-
inued to work on airbags, collaborating with Bayern-Chemicals,
osch (crash sensors), and Morton-Thiokol (inﬂators) (Nilsson et al.,
003). In 1981, Mercedes offered optional driver-side airbags for
uropean luxury cars (Struble, 1998).
.8. Changing consumer preferences and industry recreation
1984–1995)
.8.1. Problem-related pressures
Social movements and public attention: Public attention declined
n the ﬁrst half of the 1980s, but increased again from the late
980s onwards (Fig. 4), because of industry-sponsored seatbelt
ampaigns (see below) and increasing cultural sensitivity to safety,
timulated by the broader health-and-safety movement. This trans-
ated into new behavioural practices such as increased seatbelt use
Fig. 10). In the 1990s, auto-safety became institutionalized as a
ultural value and behavioural practice.
Consumers: Safety began to affect consumer preferences, creat-
ng market demand for safety features (Albaum, 2005). From theFig. 11. Relative importance of safety features as car-buying criterion (National
Research Council, 1996: p. 85).
late-1980s, surveys indicated that consumers increasingly valued
safety as a car purchase criterion (Fig. 11). Changing consumer atti-
tudes were related to several factors: (1) ongoing public debates
about auto-safety; (2) the institutionalization of the health-and-
safety movement; (3) demographic changes, such as baby boomers
reaching maturity and women becoming more involved in vehi-
cle purchase decisions (Automotive News, August, 22, 1988); (4)
disclosure of auto-safety ratings (by consumer magazines and
insurance companies), (5) industry advertisements of seatbelts and
safety features, (6) spillover from the luxury market segment to
mainstream markets.
In the early 1990s, changing consumer preferences stimulated
rapid diffusion of airbags for drivers and passengers (Fig. 12), even
before these were mandated.
Policymakers: No federal safety regulations were introduced
during the Reagan administration (Luger, 2000). But in 1984
the Supreme Court ended regulatory uncertainties by reissuing
Standard 208, mandating passive restraint systems by 1989 (Bollier
and Claybrook, 1986). A loophole promised annulment if sufﬁcient
parts of the population were covered by Mandatory Use Laws (MUL)
for seatbelts (Miller, 1988). Automakers therefore lobbied states to
pass MULs (O’Neill, 2009). By 1986, however, it became clear that
the required threshold would not be reached (because of resistance
from Californian legislators). The phase-in schedule of Standard 208
was then forwarded by 2 years. The 1991 Intermodal Surface Trans-
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0-year-long controversy on the passive restraint mandate came
o a quiet end (Abeles, 2004).
.8.2. Car industry responses
To repeal Standard 208, automakers promoted seatbelt use with
buckle-up’ advertising campaigns and a front organization (“Traf-
c Safety Now”) which lobbied states to enact MULs (Bollier and
laybrook, 1986). When the strategy failed, automakers planned
o comply to Standard 208 with automatic seatbelts. But they
ecame caught up in an unfolding airbag race, which was  trig-
ered by Mercedes’s introduction of optional airbags in 1984MY
ars (Albaum, 2005). Mercedes changed the safety debate, because
t offered airbags as complement to, not substitute of, seatbelts
O’Neill, 2009). Because Mercedes attracted positive attention from
edia and consumers, American companies also began offering
ptional airbags, Ford in 1986, Chrysler in 1987 and GM in 1989
Nilsson et al., 2003; Albaum, 2005). The cracks in the industry
ront against airbags were further stimulated by insurance compa-
ies, which offered discounts for airbag-equipped vehicles (Abeles,
004). Growing consumer demand in subsequent years triggered
n airbag innovation race and accelerated airbag-related patent-
ng activities (Fig. 6). Although American automakers experienced
ajor ﬁnancial problems in the early 1990s (Fig. 9), due to a reces-
ion and legacy problems (e.g. post-retirement and health beneﬁts),
hey did not diminish attention to safety (as in the late 1970s),
ecause it had become part of economic positioning strategies and
ndustry mission. So, by the 1990s, automakers had changed core
lements of the industry regime: (a) they abandoned the belief
hat ‘safety does not sell’, and included safety in their mission and
trategic attitudes, (b) airbags (and associated micro-electronics
nd digital technologies) changed the industry’s technical capabil-
ties. Airbag-patenting activities exploded in the 1990s (Fig. 6) as
utomakers exploited the innovation potential of digital sensors,
oftware algorithms, side and curtain airbags (Struble, 1998).
. Analysis
The case study showed the co-evolution between societal prob-
ems, industry strategies and technical solutions. To analyse the
ase we engage in pattern-matching between the empirical periods
nd the conceptual phases of the elaborated DILC-model.
The ﬁrst period (1900–1924) ﬁts with well phase 1 in the sense
hat: (a) activists, auto-clubs and newspapers demanded attention
or safety problems, (b) the National Safety Council (NSC) became
he dominant social movement organization around the car-safety
ssue, and c) automakers downplayed the role of car design. Minor
eviations from the conceptual phase 1 are: (1) local authorities
howed some interest earlier than predicted, (2) automakers did
ot deny the problem of accidents; they actually had some interest
n it and accepted the 3E-framing (which excluded car design).
The second period (1924–1942) ﬁts well with phase 2 in the
ense of: (a) increasing public attention, (b) symbolic policy action,
c) incremental innovations, and (d) the creation of a closed indus-
ry front (via the Automobile Safety Foundation) that helped
ement an advocacy coalition around the emerging 3E-framing.
he period also displayed some minor deviations from phase 2: (1)
ublic and political attention declined in the early 1930s (because
f the economic Depression) and in the late 1930s (because of
scalating military tensions), (2) an alternative interpretation of
afety-problems was advanced by outside professionals, which
ocused on the (ignored) role of car design.
In the third period (1942–1946), the issue lifecycle was
isrupted by the Second World War, which was a dramatic macro-
vent.h Policy 44 (2015) 67–82
The fourth period (1946–1955) is more difﬁcult to qualify in
terms of our phase-model. Because of high-level political con-
cern and Presidential attention, the period ﬁts with phase 4 (issue
moving into the macro-political arena). Macro-politicians did not,
however, introduce substantial policy action. This ﬁts with the
elaborated DILC-model (Section 2.2), because policymakers did not
change their understanding of the problem, but adopted the exist-
ing policy-framing advocated by mainstream actors. Because of the
lack of major policy change, automakers did not diversify towards
radically new technologies. But they did start developing some new
capabilities in corporate safety departments (a phase-3 element).
The period also deviated from phase 4 in the sense that public
attention remained relatively low in the post-war decade (because
people were more interested in fun, style, and design extrava-
ganza than in safety). This period displayed additional complexity
because of the alternative issue-framing, which gained credibility
and legitimacy because of accumulating support from professional
communities (thus displaying elements of phase 2). So, this period
has elements of different phases because there are two different
issue-frames (and associated advocacy coalitions). Because of a
pronounced macro-political dynamic, we  nevertheless propose to
characterize it as phase 4.
The ﬁfth period (1955–1965) ﬁts well with phase 3 because of
the prominence of debates in specialist sub-committees, where
the 3E-framing began to lose appeal and the alternative design-
oriented framing gained momentum (because of ongoing activities
from professional communities). The period also ﬁts phase 3
because of early industry tensions related to Ford’s differentiation
attempt with safety-innovations (which GM apprehended).
The sixth period (1965–1976) ﬁts well with phase 4: (a) pub-
lic attention escalated (because of the Ribicoff hearings and Ralph
Nader scandal), pushing the issue back into macro-political arenas,
(b) politicians introduced radical legislation (the 1966 NTMVSA),
which incorporated a change in issue-framing (emphasizing
technical design and injury-prevention), (c) automakers (reluc-
tantly) complied by implementing safety-innovations, but also
resisted standards (with litigation, lobbying, inconvenient tech-
nical designs), (d) automakers explored more radical alternatives
(airbags), causing cracks in the front against airbags (because of
GM’s strategic differentiation attempt in 1974), which closed again
in 1976, (e) automakers did not incorporate safety in their mission
because they believed that it was externally imposed by regulators,
not demanded by customers.
The seventh period (1976–1984) ﬁts well with phase 3 because
of: (a) political and technical controversies over standards in
the policy sub-system, (b) deliberate weakening of safety imple-
mentation in the policy sub-system (especially under the Reagan
administration), and (c) diminished innovation efforts by automak-
ers.
In the eighth period (1984–1995), the issue quickly moved
through phase 4 and into phase 5. The 1984 Supreme Court
decision was a macro-political event that reinstated implemen-
tation pressure (phase 4). Meanwhile, however, the safety-issue
was affecting mainstream consumer preferences, creating mar-
kets for safety-innovation (phase 5). So, legislation (in 1984 and
1991) formalized what was already happening in the market.
The emerging economic opportunities enabled Mercedes (a rel-
atively small ﬁrm in American markets) to jockey for position
with safety-innovations such as combined airbags and seat-
belt packages (phase 4). Mercedes’s success helped to break
up the closed industry front and triggered an innovation race
(phase 5), which resulted in comprehensive reorientation in
the 1990s, with ﬁrms including safety in core beliefs, missions,
strategies and technical capabilities (phase 5). This dynamic high-
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The above analysis suggests that most periods had a relatively
ood match with a particular phase in the elaborated DILC-model.
ome periods had minor deviations in the sense of also display-
ng characteristics of another phase or having other actors perform
redicted activities (e.g. professional communities criticizing the
E-framing rather than social movements). Such deviations are to
e expected because real-world cases are usually more complex
han stylized conceptual frameworks. So, the DILC-model should
e used ﬂexibly as a heuristic sense-making framework and not as
n analytical straightjacket.
The case had three larger deviations from the DILC-model, which
rovide scope for reﬂections about further conceptual elabora-
ions. First, while the DILC-model tends to emphasize increasing
roblem-related pressures on industries, the eighth period addi-
ionally highlights the importance of (technical and economic)
pportunities for industry reorientation (and the role of relative out-
iders in breaking closed industry fronts). This deviation suggests
hat the DILC-model should pay more attention to the role of oppor-
unities in phase 4 and 5. This does not invalidate the emphasis on
roblem-related pressures, which are likely to be important in the
onstruction of opportunities (e.g. through spillovers to consumer
references), but it does suggest that the DILC-model should better
ccommodate a relative shift in emphasis from pressures in earlier
hases to opportunities in later phases.
The second larger deviation is that the case did not follow a
inear sequence of ﬁve phases, but instead moved backwards and
orwards between phases. We  therefore conclude that auto-safety
ollowed a ‘cyclical’ pattern, in which the issue experienced several
ps and downs: phase 1 (1900–1924), phase 2 (1924–1942), inter-
uption (1942–1946), phase 4 (1946–1955), phase 3 (1955–1965),
hase 4 (1965–1976), phase 3 (1976–1984), phases 4 and 5
1984–1995). The case study conﬁrms the propositions in Section
.3 that deviations from the ‘normal’ path are related to: (a) ups
nd downs in problem-related pressure such as public attention
o auto-safety and the weakening of the 3E-framing and advocacy
oalition (which moved the issue back to phase 3 in the 1955–1965
eriod), (b) successful industry ﬁght-back, which resulted in imple-
entation struggles and controversies (which moved the issue
ack to phase 3 in the 1976–1984 period), (c) changing macro-
ontexts such as World War  2 and the political ideology of the
eagan administration (which moved the issue back to phase 3 in
he 1976–1984 period).
The third deviation is that the case entailed a major change
n the interpretation of the safety-issue, from the 3E-framing to
he design-oriented injury-prevention framing. The case there-
ore contained two dynamics related to different issue-framings,
hich is why certain periods (e.g. 1946–1955) had characteristics
f two phases. Despite competition from the emerging injury-
revention framing, the established 3E-framing was  still dominant
n the 1946–1955 period, which helps explain why  no major pol-
cy change occurred when the issue reached the macro-political
rena in that period. Major change in the directionality of the issue-
ifecycle (and major policy change) did occur in the 1965–1976
eriod, when the design-oriented framing reached the macro-
olitical agenda. So, the case suggests that more complex patterns
an also arise from changes in the meaning and deﬁnition of soci-
tal problems, which is something that could be explored further
n future research.
. ConclusionsWe  conclude that the elaborated DILC-model is a useful heuris-
ic framework to analyse the co-evolution of societal problems and
ndustry reorientation. The further speciﬁcations of core dynam-
cs and mechanisms within phases allow for more differentiatedh Policy 44 (2015) 67–82 81
interpretations of real-world cases. Minor deviations between
complex cases and the DILC-model should be expected. Larger devi-
ations require further explanation and reﬂection, as we attempted
above. We  suggest that the elaborated DILC-model goes some way
in addressing the research gap identiﬁed by Morlacchi and Martin
(2009). In particular, we highlight the importance of analysing
the co-evolving dynamics of both problems and solutions, which
differentiates our conceptual model from the innovation system
approach mentioned in the introduction. Based on the elabo-
rated model and two  case studies (air pollution and auto-safety),
we highlight the following salient aspects regarding industry
reorientation towards addressing societal problems. After ini-
tial denial and downplaying, industry actors may  start exploring
alternatives when policymakers begin discussing the problem
and possible solutions (phase 3). Policy change in policy sub-
systems may, however, remain incremental for long periods, as
does industry reorientation. More substantial policy change, which
requires a high public sense of urgency and problem redeﬁni-
tion in macro-political arenas, may  trigger further (reluctant)
reorientation (phase 4). Powerful ﬁrms, especially when operat-
ing as closed industry fronts, may  be very effective in hindering
and delaying the implementation of substantive policies. Com-
prehensive reorientation (phase 5) therefore requires spillovers to
consumer preferences, the emergence of market opportunities,  and
successful initiatives (often by relative outsiders) that can open up
closed industry fronts and trigger innovation races.
With regard to the second contribution, we  conclude that the
case study validates the ‘cyclical’ lifecycle path, in which issues
move forwards and backwards through phases, depending on
the three factors identiﬁed above. We tentatively suggest that
this cyclical pattern may  have relevance for contemporary ‘grand
societal challenges’, such as climate change, where strong vested
interests and multiple potential solutions supported by various
stakeholders in shifting coalitions are unlikely to follow a linear
lifecycle pattern. We  further suggest that complex patterns may
also arise from changes in problem-deﬁnitions and interpretations
of social problems. The case study indicates that issue lifecycles
need not be singular and can contain multiple competing issue-
framings and coalitions. We recommend further investigation of
this aspect in future research.
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